The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Foreign Policy Towards the European Union in the Last Three Decades

The Enemies of the Islamic Revolution
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Foreign Policy Towards the European Union in the Last Three Decades

The History of Iran-Europe Relations

 

As explained by Shireen T. Hunter in her book, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order, Iran’s post-revolutionary relations with the countries of Europe cannot be understood without studying the historical context of their relations. If present-day Europe is seen as the successor to ancient Greece and Rome, then Iran and Europe have interacted for three thousand years. However, beyond the circle of specialists, European knowledge of Iran, as well as its culture and contribution to world civilization is limited. This lack of intrinsic European interest in Iran has continued into modern times. Such interest has been derived from other concerns: dealing with the Ottoman threat, protecting India, gaining access to warm waters, preventing Russian/Soviet expansion, and protecting Arabian oilfields.

 

The Europeans’ lack of knowledge about Iran has been accompanied by distorted images of the country and its people. Europeans have viewed the Persian empire as the archetype of Eastern despotism and the Persians as the barbarians who threatened civilized Athens and Rome. There has been little awareness of Iran’s contributions to Western civilization, including what it has imparted directly and what it has transmitted from other civilizations to the West. For more than 1,300 years, Islamic Iran has not been treated fairly. Europeans recognize that their cultural and scientific renaissance owes much to Islamic civilization, yet most would identify Islamic civilization with the Arabs. Paradoxically, the Europeans neglect and underestimation of Iran has been accompanied by an almost unconscious view of it as a rival to the West and by a recognition that Irans challenge to the ancient Western world was not only that of a brute force but also of a highly developed culture and politics. Hence, the West acknowledges, albeit grudgingly, Irans achievements and potential. Yet, because of its decline during the last two centuries, an element of disdain has dominated their view of Iran. Furthermore, to its ancient image as the land of barbarians was added that of a spineless, lethargic, decadent, and unjustifiably vain people.

 

According to Hunter, the overreaction to the Islamic Revolution reflects the impact of these contradictory perceptions. The Islamic Revolution has conjured up images of Iranian “barbarians” once more threatening civilized citadels of the West. During the Iran-Iraq War, it was often said that Iraq is defending civilization against barbarism, thus justifying the West’s support of Iraq.

 

The reaction of the West to the Shah in his last years, including the Western outcry about Iran’s hegemonism in the Persian Gulf, derived from similar factors. The Shah was neither more repressive nor more corrupt than other allies of the West, from Ferdinand Marcos to Mobutu Sese Seko. But Iran sat at a strategic corner and had the potential of serious middle-sized power. Therefore, the Shah had to be contained and hence he was charged with seeking expansionism, suffering from the imperial megalomania, and possessing a murderous character. Likewise, they were accusing Ayatollah Khomeini of having the desire to create an Islamic empire and greater emphasis was placed on Iran’s human rights violations than those of countries such as Iraq, Syria, and other allies of the West such as Turkey. This is also derived from Iran’s potential to be a rival to the West.

 

In fact, during the late 1970s, strains in Iran’s relations with Europe and the United States originated largely from the tension in relations between great powers and core regional powers, since even a friendly core regional power is a potential rival and has ambitions that are not always compatible with those of the greater powers. Thus, despite the Shah’s pro-Western orientation, the West disliked his growing ambitions and strength. Likewise, the intensity of the reaction of the West to the Islamic Revolution, compared with its response to other the Middle East radical movements, stemmed not only from Irans ideology but also from the fact that, if successful, it could enhance Irans regional influence and its competitive potential. 

 

Therefore, whether justified or not, the historical legacy of Iran’s experience with Europe has derived from an underlying feeling of resentment — shared even by Westernized Iranians. This means that Iranians have always been unfairly treated. Western Europe’s support for Iraq – despite its aggression and its exaggeration of the Iranian threat – has enhanced such feelings. This resentment has not determined Iran’s approach toward the West. The intensity of Iran’s resentment towards Western European countries has been directly related to its experience with each of these states. Until the end of World War II, Iran’s contacts with Europe were limited to a few countries.

 

In the nineteenth century, its foreign relations were primarily marked by a close relationship with the United Kingdom and Russia, which had a total of 65 consular offices in Iran. On the other hand, except for a brief period during the rule of Napoleon, France’s presence in Iran has been mostly cultural. Thus, not having experienced a semi-colonial relationship with France, Iran has generally been well-disposed towards it, although this historic goodwill has been largely eroded because of France’s support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Similarly, German influence in Iran was limited to the 1930s when Iran used Germany to balance its relations with the United Kingdom and Russia. Therefore, Germany also has retained a positive image among Iranians.

 

Europe and Iran: Some Underlying Attitudes

 

Since the mid-nineteenth century, an important aspect of Iran’s diplomatic strategy has

been a quest for a counterweight to Anglo-Russian influence. Hence, Iran was interested in expanding ties with European countries. Yet because of Anglo-Russian obstruction and the lack of significant European interest, this strategy had little success, except for the period of German influence in the 1930s. The German occupation of the Netherlands and Belgium during World War II interrupted Iran’s relations with the Low Countries, and then the Allied occupation of Iran put an end to its ties with Germany and Italy. After World War II, Iran’s political instability and Europe’s preoccupation with reconstruction kept relations from expanding.

 

After the Islamic Revolution, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has undergone various changes, and we have witnessed the dominance of a particular discourse at every stage of its political life. Those involved in all these discourses focused their statements, approaches and the implementation of the foreign policy on the national interests in an attempt to realize the objectives of the country’s foreign policy. Given Iran’s foreign policy after the Islamic Revolution, one may argue that Iran’s foreign policy discourse from the very beginning has been swaying between idealism and realism, although the adoption of one did not mean ignoring the other, and the country’s leaders were neither mere idealists nor mere realists.

 

The European Union which is constituted of 28 countries including several influential political units of the international system such as Germany, s and France, is one of the most influential political actors in the international arena and the Middle East. Geographical importance, cultural influence, and being at the center of the world’s oil and gas energy resources are the main reasons for the European Union’s interest in and relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The four issues of terrorism, human rights, weapons of mass destruction and Middle East peace talks are the most important variables and factors influencing the relations between Iran and the European Union in the last two decades. Such issues caused the relations between the two sides not to go beyond mere dialogue, despite their mutual strategic needs. 

 

However, despite the structural conflicts and cultural and values differences as well as having disagreements over the definition of the terms such as security, justice, freedom, human rights and terrorism, the Islamic Republic of Iran and European countries always seek to overcome obstacles and deal with the existing crises because of their mutual national and economic interests.

 

Reference: International Relations Journal. Vol 7, No 28, Spring 2015, Pp. 133-166.

 

Archive of The Enemies of the Islamic Revolution

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