Guadeloupe; A Conference meant to Save Pahlavi II (2)

Since this conference was confidential and unofficial, the results also remained somewhat confidential, and only contradictory news reached the media. Dr. Sadeq Tabatabaie, who was one of Imam Khomeini’s revolutionary companions, has said in this regard: “We were informed of the results of the conference through the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which indicated that there was a disagreement between Giscard and Schmidt on one side and Carter on the other. Carter believed that the current situation in Iran should still be tolerated, and pressure should be exerted on Imam Khomeini and the Muslims to accept the government of Bakhtiar. However, Schmidt and Giscard believed that the era of the Shah’s rule had come to an end, and keeping the Shah by the use of force would not calm the people. This would only lead to more bloodshed. Therefore, it is better to let the Revolution play out.”

Various sources have reported on this matter. One of them mentioned: “The president of France suggested that a message would be sent to Tehran, firmly asking the Shah to leave Iran. Carter was upset by this suggestion and stated that he did not want to force the Shah to stay or leave the country. However, with the cooperation of Britain, he would provide the necessary facilities for the Shah’s possible departure. Callaghan and Schmidt agreed with this proposal.” After the conference, Jimmy Carter also made statements implying that none of the leaders at the meeting showed eagerness to support the Shah. He added, “At Guadeloupe, none of the leaders I spoke with showed great enthusiasm for supporting the Shah. All three of them believed that the Shah should give up his position to a non-monarchial government and leave Iran. However, they agreed with me that the army should stay united and show no inclination towards Ayatollah Khomeini and radical elements. Giscard privately told me that he intended to expel Ayatollah Khomeini from France but the Shah asked him not to do so, because it would be much more dangerous if Ayatollah Khomeini went to Libya or another Arab country hostile to Iran.”

Barry Rubin, an American researcher, wrote the following about the Guadeloupe Conference: “The leaders of the three European countries agreed that the Shah’s role is over. Giscard’s speech, after all, was very strong on this point. He said, ‘If the Shah stays, Iran will experience a civil war. Many people will be killed, and the Communists will gain significant influence. Ultimately, American military advisors would get involved, and this could provide an opportunity for the engagement of Russia.” “What Europe needs is Iranian oil and regional stability,” he added.

As far as the media coverage of the issue is concerned, it is worth mentioning an article published by United Press International a day after the conference. In it they wrote, “While waiting for a signal from the United States, the Shah of Iran must finally decide whether he would stay in Iran or leave the country, which could lead to the end of his monarchy. Due to increasing popular opposition in Iran, the United States cannot support him.”

Commenting on the decisions made at the Guadeloupe Conference regarding his departure from Iran, the Shah said, “Since December, I have been under pressure to leave the country. Over the course of several weeks of negotiations for the formation of a coalition government, my departure for vacation was a primary condition... I believe that in the Guadeloupe Conference, France and Germany agreed with the view of Britain and the United States regarding my expulsion.”

However, researchers have various views on this matter, with some emphasizing disagreements, while others highlighting the consensus among leaders of Western countries concerning the Shah’s departure from Iran. Nonetheless, it is evident that the West had realized that the Shah had reached the end of the line, lost control of governance, and continuing his reign, despite all the opposition, would only lead to more turmoil and conflict.

Regardless of all these factors, the West had interests in Iran, most importantly the oil. They were analyzing whether they could still maintain relations with Iran after the Shah’s departure and the establishment of an Islamic government. For this reason, after Carter returned to Washington, it was decided that the French government, on behalf of the United States, negotiate with Imam Khomeini. On January 8, 1979, the president of France sent two delegates to Neauphle-le-Château to meet with Imam Khomeini. They conveyed a message from Carter, which stated, “Carter said that the situation in Iran is critical, and you should support Bakhtiar’s government to reduce the tensions; then, in line with the democratization process, elections will be held to determine the type of governance.” In response, Imam Khomeini said, “I am surprised that Mr. Carter, who himself is a democrat and runs a democratic country, should adhere to the law, yet he asks us to act contrary to the law. Does he not know that the Shah’s regime is illegal, and therefore, Bakhtiar, who has been appointed by the Shah, also has no legal authority?”