The Impacts of Islamic Revolution in Iran on the Evolution of Afghanistan

The political discourse of wilayati[1] political Islam in Afghanistan could be considered a consequence of the politicization of Shi’ahs in recent centuries. Over the contemporary and older history of Afghanistan, the Shi’ahs have always experienced the wilayah (guardianship) of Iraqi or Iranian jurisprudents; a type of unpolitical guardianship that corresponds to Islamic rulings and taxes. In Afghanistan, the religious Shi’ah leaders while complying with theological principles such as taqiyyah (prudence or reservation), looking forward to the reappearance of Imam al-Mahdi (a) and following the practices of prominent jurisprudents of Najaf and Qom, have not involved much in political affairs until the mid-twentieth century. Since Shi’ah were in minority, they considered disengagement from political spheres as a method for preserving the Shi’ah identity in a Sunni country. In the late twentieth century and especially after extending the political arenas in the decade of democracy (1963-1973), the first offshoots of wilayati political Islam appeared in Afghanistan.

 

The arrival of wilayati political Islam into Afghanistan occurred when a group of seminary students left the country and after many years of studying in Najaf and Qom through the 1950s and afterward, came back to Afghanistan. They did not transfer only the knowledge of jurisprudence but also some of them who inspired by pioneer Iranian and Iraqi Islamists heavily had adopted political inclinations and believed in the theory of political wilayah of jurisprudents over the mass. Sayyed Esmail Balkhi was the prominent figure among those who have returned. He was a well-known personality among the Shi’ah Iranian and Iraqi scholars and gained a powerful influence among Shi’ahs. In fact, Sayyed Esmail Balkhi who was a religious intellectual reformist can be identified as the stepfather of wilayati Islamists in Afghanistan. He practiced the wilayati form of political Islam even though he utilized the intellectual Islamists’ methods especially Iqbal Lahori on many occasions. After the triumph of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the leaders who had studied in Najaf or Qom assumed the leadership of Shi’ah movements. They overthrow the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) governance in central parts of the country and brought them under their rulership. The main core of wilayati political Islam, which started to become revolutionary and emphasized the teaching of jihad under the influence of current circumstances, though it constituted various tendencies, was as follows: the right of political wilayah for the clergy. Mousavi puts the current Shi’ah groups of Afghanistan from 1985 to 1978 into three main categories:

 

First, the groups that were active in Afghanistan since the 1960s. These groups were run by leaders who were not the clergy and were following the theory of “Islam without the clergy” that was expressed and held by Shari’ati. Most of the educated Shi’ahs advocated their belief. The most famous of these groups were the Mujahidin, the Muhajir Club, the Association of Muslim Students, the Oppressed Rising Group and the Group of Islam the School of Monotheism.

 

The second category includes groups that had progressive and politically active clerics as their leaders. They started their work in the 1970s and were advocates of Ayatollah Khomeini. Almost all the Hazara[2] groups that formed in Iran belonged to this category. Unlike the first one, these people supported the authority of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurisprudent) in Afghanistan and therefore came under the direct influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The third category included the traditional Shi’ah clergy. They were exposed to criticism and as a result, could not be able to gain the attention of either the educated class who were not clerics or members of the progressive clergy. The Islamic Movement belonged to this group.

 

The wilayati Islamists in Afghanistan seemed so disunited during the events of the 1980s-1990s. It was institutionalized alliances and separations that weakened them significantly. At first, it was assumed that by overthrowing the communist system, wilayati political Islam in complying with the political Islam of the Sunnis had to desist from political wilayah and adjust itself to the discourse of Rabbani governance (1992-1996). The discourse was fruitless and consequently, the concept of wilayah (guardianship) lost almost all its validity. By the way, the affiliation of most of them to the ideology of Wilayat al-Faqih would resort to the credibility of that discourse. Finally, with the discourse of caliphate becoming dominant in the 1990s, wilayati political Islam was withdrawn from the leadership contest. With overthrowing of the Taliban in 2001, the followers of the wilayati school of thought initiated political activities without having any political wilayah claim and with a modern face.

 

The Interrelation of Nodal Point of Guardianship (Wilayah) and Religious-Ethnic Identity

 

Wilayah is the nodal point within the discourse of wilayati political Islam. In addition, the concept of caliphate plays the central role in the discourse of caliphate political Islam regarding the issue of caliphate. Within the discourse analysis theory, nodal point maintains close ties with identity and would affect the identity disorder in a nodal point discourse. This matter is clearly can be seen in the articulation of the discourse of wilayati political Islam in Afghanistan. The question is why wilayati political Islam in Afghanistan began to engage in making discourses? Suffice to say that it has been caused by two reasons. First, intensifying theoretical discussions in recent centuries among Shi’ah jurisprudents in general and distinguished ones in particular, have had implications some of which the provoking of different aspects of political wilayah was the most important. The consequences of such discourses in Iran and Iraq after the fundamental political changes in those countries penetrated into Afghanistan and the Afghan Shi’ahs who had experienced the status of being a minority over history took significant steps toward politicization.

 

Second, the pioneers of wilayati political Islam since the 1970s realized that their Shi’ah identity was endangered. Historical deprivations and being the second class in society along with various limitations concerning performing rituals contributed significantly to the formation and development of wilayati political Islam. The executors of political Islam along with Sunni Islamists called for the transition of cultural, social and political foundations especially after the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan seized power; in addition, wilayati Islamists had other demands as well. They called for the recognition of their faith and therefore stated that the past restrictions on practicing one’s faith and rituals should be removed and their religious isolation must be finished. Bearing in mind the fact that merely being a Shi’ah or Hazara would bring humiliation, oppression, and cruel behaviour from the Pashtun authorities and high-ranked Sunni scholars – Molavai – the Shi’ah asked for changing of the status quo. The contemporary Afghan historian Husayn Nayel believes that the religious identity of Shi’ahs or Hazara has always been exposed to elimination. He wrote: for a long history, the word Hazara has indicated degradation and often the person would suffer loss and punishment. Accordingly, some people who wanted to avoid such consequences hid their identity and even the weak ones decided to change their names, an attempt which was so painful and brought a disgrace on feudalist, divisive and biased systems of the past (Nayel, 143: 2000).

 

The executors of wilayati political Islam even until the end of the jihad period, were dealing with the issue of their religious and ethnic identity through interactions with others. How this matter is being deep-rooted could be seen in the words of Abdul-Ali Mazari, the secretary-general of Islamic Unity Party, at that time, when in order to reject the claims of some of the Sunni Islamists’ leaders, he said:

 

The brothers who were in the city of Peshawar believed that there is only two or three percent of Shi’ahs in Afghanistan and the media announced that the minority Shi’ah has no right to be a part of the governmental system. Hence, we realized that if it is the case then so far, we went the wrong way and instead of trying to establish a purely Islamic and independent state, we must prove our existence in Afghanistan. The Islamic Unity Party was founded based on this thought (Mazari, 1995: 52-53).

 

Moments of Discourse Concerning Wilayati Political Islam

 

1) Imamate (Leadership)

 

Wilayah is a concept consequent to imamate. Imamate is a theological issue posed by a number of Muslims who believed Imam Ali (a) succeeded Prophet Muhammad (s) as the leader of the community. For the Shi’ahs, the spiritual position of Imamate is much higher than caliphate for Sunnis. The Sunnis believe that the caliph is the outcome of counselling and collaborative wisdom of those who attended Saqifah Bani Sa’idah, but on the other hand, Shi’ahs consider the Imamate as a divine status that humanity could not determine. Likewise, the executors of wilayati political Islam in Afghanistan regard imamate as a crucial factor that constitutes a large portion of their identity. The history of political strives of Shi’ah Islamists indicates that they have viewed the issue of Imamate as a fundamental belief and exemplification of redemption. Likewise, Mir-Husayn Sadeqi one of the leaders of the Nasr Organization stated that “the authoritative administration of Muslim world and acting within the law would continue today through Imamate.”

 

Throughout the political history of Afghanistan, the Shi’ah Islamists have always looked for role models in the matter of Imamate. When the hardships befell them so that they had no choice but to accept the situation, they would have resembled their strategy to the policy of Imam Ali (a) in avoiding to act publicly for about 25 years; also when they had no other option but to comply with the rulings of dictatorial regimes and enduring the terrible circumstances while referring to the peace treaty between Imam al-Hasan (a) and Mu’awiyah, they would consider that akin to the situation that Muslims in the first days of Islam faced. Most importantly, by citing Imam al-Husayn’s movement in Karbala especially during political rivalries that occurred through the period between 1978-1992 when Afghanistan was overwhelmed by the teaching of jihad, the executors of wilayati political Islam would endure the difficulties with tolerance and patience. Hamid Enayat believes that Shi’ah Islamism has taken similar steps and utilized the natural aspects of exemplification of Imams (a).

 

He wrote: “Arguments and debates made to prove the exaltation of Imam Ali (a) and his holy descendants, were taking new forms in a manner that instead of focusing on supernatural and metaphysical attributes they would express the natural and human features of Imams. Imams (a) are adorned primarily because of the wise and fair decisions they have made in the political sphere. Imam Ali’s disengagement from political affairs, the sense of political realism adopted by Imam al-Hasan (a), Imam al-Husayn’s revolutionary insight and even Imam al-Sadiq’s withdrawal from politics are all counted as wise political considerations.” (Enayat, 89:1993).

 

2) The Islamic Revolution in Iran

 

Religion is the key factor that has resulted in close ties between Shi’ahs of Afghanistan and Iran throughout history. The triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), which was simultaneous with the transfer of power from the republicans to communists in Afghanistan, had a significant impact on changing the political position of Shi’ahs of Afghanistan. At the same time, the executors of wilayati political Islam began to establish the political organizations and by the supports of leaders of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, they had entered a new stage of jihad against communists and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, specifying the general guidelines for the export of revolution by Imam Khomeini, facilitated the process of creating currents for wilayati Islamists some of whom were either his students or following his jurisprudential opinions. Chengiz Pahlavan states: “During the days of Islamic Revolution in Iran, some analysts abroad were referring to the matter of exporting Islamic Revolution to Afghanistan. The discourse of exporting the revolution was spread in a way that every researcher outside of Iran while addressing this issue were talking about the export of the Iranian Revolution to other countries.” (Pahlavan, 326: 1998)

 

Sayyed Hadi Khosroshahi claims that the revolutionary Shi’ah parties in Afghanistan from 1979 up to 1988 remained completely loyal to ideals of the Islamic Revolution and were fighting against the Soviet Unions as well as the United States of America. (Khosrohshahi, 226: 1991)

 

Mentioning the United States and the Soviet Union by Khosroshahi discovers the fact that wilayati Islamists through pursuing the policy of “Neither East nor West” followed the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Even this slogan was considered an important pillar for most of the constitutions of the Shi’ah parties at the time. Subsequently, the Islamic Unity Party which was almost founded by the unification of major and minor Islamist parties of the past established the concept of “Covenant of Unity.”

 

Khosroshahi states that: “In 1980 and after the establishment of the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, the government of Iran gave widespread support to the party. The Unity Party on the other hand by advocating the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran asserted their commitment to the ideals of Islamic Revolution.” (ibid: 225) Altogether we may say that the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 had a special impact on the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Most of the Hazara are Shi’ahs who have strong religious and cultural ties with Iran. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was a source of inspiration for many of the social groups of Afghanistan in general and Hazara in particular. While employing these events, the Hazara community made itself enter a new stage that is called “the social transition period.” (Mousavi, 250: 2000)

 

3) The Guardianship of the Jurisprudent

 

After the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the idea of Wilayat al-Faqih emerged within the discourse of wilayati political Islam in Afghanistan. This concept was welcomed by the Shi’ah Islamists. It seemed that the principle of Wilayat al-Faqih Jurisprudent was a missing part of their lives that was exemplified by Imam Khomeini’s character. This doctrine was legitimizing and facilitating the affairs not only for the revolutionaries in Iran but also for the executors of Shi’ah political Islam in Afghanistan. Olivier Roy writes about the status of this principle within the ideology of Shi’ahs in Afghanistan comparing to the discourses of political Islam of Sunnis: “Two pillars of imamate and Wilayat al-Faqih within Shi’ism have given religious legitimacy to the concept of theocracy and persuaded Shi’ahs that following the religious and political instructions of jurisprudents is considered to be among religious teachings and an act of worship. Nevertheless, the Sunnis have a completely different outlook. According to the Sunni point of view, the political wilayah of the jurisprudents lacks legitimacy and the concept of Imamate within Shi’ism as well as the Pope in Roman Catholicism have no equivalent in the Sunni school of thought.” (Roy, 1985: 116)

 

Without a doubt, the nodal point of the guardianship of jurisprudent during the first years of the foundation of organizations dealing with the discourse of wilayah was highlighted in a manner that no Shi’ah Islamist party could ignore. Some who belonged to the wilayati Islamists in Afghanistan can be divided into two groups: those who follow the Wilayah ideology and those who do not. Although, during the years when almost all of the Shi’ah jihadi parties of Iran addressed the principle of guardianship of the jurisprudent mainly through the first article of their statues, there was an exception. That was called The Islamic Movement of Afghanistan that was under the leadership of Muhammad-Asef Mohseni. Even though Mohseni had studied Islamic teachings presented by Ayatollah Khoei and on different occasions venerated Ayatollah Khomeini and Khoei, but he has been doubtful about accepting the principle of Wilayat al-Faqih. Roy writes about him: “ideologically, The Islamic Movement of Afghanistan was adopting the doctrine of moderate Islam (Shari’atmadari in Iran and Khoei in Iraq). There is a good correlation between the party and Ayatollahs in Iran but has strained relations with Revolutionary Guards and devotees of Khomeini. Despite being a disciple of Khoei and living in Qom since 1979, Mohseni was treated with suspicion by the devotees of Imam Khomeini. (Roy, 232: 1990).

 

4) Islamic Governance

 

From the perspective of the first generation of wilayati Islamists such as Esmail Balkhi and Sayyed Sarvar Vaez (during the 1950s and 1960s), Islamic governance could not be established under the monarchy or a Sunni ruler in Afghanistan. Bur for the second generation of wilayatis in the 1970s and 1980s, while following leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, assertively were talking about Islamic governance though they had no obvious definition of the essence and form of the term available at the time. Likewise, a number of people who do not affiliate with the doctrine of wilayah have established an abridged version of Islamic governance in 1980 throughout regions with Shi’ah populations. This rulership which was operated by a council of Shi’ah elites and with the supremacy of the clergy constituted the least structures necessary for a governing system. Sayyed Ali Beheshti, the head of the council, claimed that he possesses the ability to carry ijtihad. He was trying to implement Islamic rulings throughout the Muslim territory without referring to the great jurisprudents of Qom and Najaf. Likewise, Ayatollah Mohammad-Asef Mohseni was considering the issue of Islamic governance. Within the Islamic Unity Party, Ayatollah Mohseni was more than a leader and it seemed that he was ruling over an Islamic state that had no boundaries. He even intended to present a substantial plan for the Muslim world. Thus, by going beyond the limits of the theory of Islamic governance, he talked about a “unified Islamic Republic,” saying, “We hope that by the grace of God a “unified Islamic Republic” that includes Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries alike, comes into existence and the Islamic system of governance will be practiced in all countries.” (Mohseni, 42: 1981)

 

For those who follow the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, the Islamic government had a more obvious meaning. In their view, the Islamic state is a government dominated by the supreme leader. Of course, they were sceptical about whether they can create examples of the “Islamic Republic” in Afghanistan. However, the establishment of a government in a country with a Sunni majority could not be feasible. Therefore, the establishment of an Islamic government was merely an inspiring ideal. Khosroshahi believes that the Nasr Organization, comparing to its counterparts, has greater motivation and capacity to establish Islamic governance. “The Nasr Organization advocates the formation of a system with the same features of the political system of Iran, and as far as the military power is concerned, it can fulfill his duties in creating the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in the future.” (Khosroshahi, 1991: 32)

 

5) Social Justice

 

Shi’ahs have always been tormented by the Sunni governments. Although the demands for justice made by wilayati Islamists in the early 1940s and 1950s did not meet and high-ranking clerics accused of overthrowing the government were imposed a severe punishment, but social justice remained a legitimate and essential demand in the minds of the pioneers of the Shi’ah community. For Shi’ah Islamists, social justice was considered as the priority in the Decade of Imperial Democracy (1963-1973). Abdul-Qayyum Sajjadi analyzes the strategic difference between Shi’ah and Sunni Islam in Afghanistan at this time: there was somehow a significant difference between the discourse of Sunni and Shi’ah Islamism on which the internal conditions and capabilities, capacities, and external factors of two discourses had influenced. Sunni Islamists took a defensive position against the leftist and communist currents, but gradually were inspired by the revolutionary ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jama’ah and therefore began to propound the call for the establishment of Islamic governance. On the other hand, Shi’ah discourse emphasized social justice and due to social constraints, did not think of the establishment of a religious government (Sajjadi, 2009: 230.) The creed observed by all parties and movements of the Shi’ah community in Afghanistan shows that social justice has been considered as the main concern. Although for other minority groups in Afghanistan the ideal of ​​social justice is one of their main demands, it should be noted that these demands have not been of such vital importance to any other group. The reason is that the Shi’ahs of Afghanistan, the majority of whom are the Hazaras, are a minority in terms of ethnicity and religiousness and thus have suffered more discrimination. “Social justice for Hazaras is equal to the end of a century of ethnic, linguistic and religious discrimination, and the right to political participation paves the way for restoring identity as well as their social and political personality in Afghanistan.” (Mousavi, 2000: 249)

 

On the eve of the collapse of the People’s Democratic Party (1992), the leaders of the Sunni parties did not include the name of any Shi’ah politician among the officials of the provisional government which soon was about to gain power in Kabul. This has led Shi’ah leaders, especially Abdul-Ali Mazari, to highlight social justice more than ever before. In the view of Mazari, the Shi’ahs were facing an important historical time of which if they could not pass, they would have to delay the fulfillment of the ideal of social justice to an unknown time in the future. Therefore, he repeatedly discussed social justice in the context of talks on peace and reconciliation. In brief, his demands for the Rabbani government were three things, all three refer to the principle of social justice, “We want three things for this country in the future: one is the recognition of our religion. Second, the old formations and structures are unfair and must change. Third, the Shi’ah should have the opportunity to be involved in the process of decision-making.” (Mazari, 1995:75).

 

6) Jihad

 

Although Fawaz Gerges believes that jihad in Afghanistan (1992-1978) is the result of the integration of Salafism and the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, or “the result of the engagement of Nile of Egypt and the deserts of Saudi Arabia” (Gerges 2005: 76), this jihad includes another type as well. In the past, the executors of wilayati political Islam often used tactics such as taqiyyah and expediency along with considering the infallible Imams (a) as role models, to adopt peaceful methods and avoid violence. However, after the communists gained power in 1978, wilayati Islamists, along with the Islamists of the Sunni community, entered the phase of jihad. From their point of view, the domination of the communist regime over the fate of Muslims ended history. The triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran assured a wide range of political Islamist politicians that the time for jihad has arrived. Imam Khomeini’s fatwa on the illegitimacy of the communist regime in Afghanistan facilitated the process of jihad.

 

Therefore, in the view of pioneers of wilayati Islam, Nur Mohammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal and Najibullah, were among the religious antagonists, polytheists and origins of corruption and destruction. However, the Shi’ah executors of political Islam used less the word “jihad” comparing to their Sunni counterparts. Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, they tended to count themselves as “revolutionaries” rather than “mujahid.” Yet, a range of intellectual Shi’ah Islamists, on the one hand, ought to separate themselves from the Sunnis through using the concept of “resistance” and no longer affiliated with “Islamic Revolution” on the other hand.

 

Those who wrote the bloody history of wilayati political Islam especially after 1978, have preferred the use of the term ‘resistance,’ that had a strong connection with the concept of social justice, rather than ‘jihad.’” (Mousavi, 2000, Pouladi, 2008, Doy Fouladi, 1998).

 

7) Ashura

 

According to Hamid Enayat, the emotionalism of the Shi’ah has had a long-lasting effect on Shi’ah culture than the Sufi tendencies had on Sunni societies. This manner would be a great help to despotism. He believes that many Shi’ahs would rather be oppressed than standing up against the current tyrannical powers (Enayat, 1993: 61). From the viewpoint of Shi’ahs, emotionalism has two perspectives: first that contains a red background is the Day of Ashura of the 61 AH, during which a few of Imam al-Husayn’s devotees along with his family sacrificed their lives for the sake of the Truth and justice. Secondly, the one that has a green background is the bitter occultation of Imam al-Mahdi (aj) the last of the Shi’ah Imams, which will lead to a joyful reappearance that preserves hope in the hearts of the Shi’ahs. John Esposito described the function of these two states: the event of Ashura provides a desirable historical pattern of the Shi’ahs. A symbol of oppression and outburst, suffering and martyrdom, jihad against ruthless rulers and social injustice. This is a struggle between oppressors and the oppressed. In this battle, the oppressed have risen to fight against social and political injustice. The pattern of Imam al-Husayn’s martyrdom was linked to the idea of awaiting the last Imam. Twelver Shi’ahs shape a Twelver Imami thread for political-religious leadership of the society. The Shi’ahs believe that the twelfth Imam, who is now in occultation, will appear in the future as the Mahdi and will bring justice to the whole world (Esposito, 127: 2011).

 

Muharram has gained a very strong foothold within the religious culture of the Shi’ahs of Afghanistan. Despite the existing limitations, they have tried to preserve the teachings of Ashura and the culture of mourning. “For the Hazara, Muharram is a month with no equivalent. Muharram is the peak of grief and sadness. Muharram is so important for the Hazara that all social customs such as weddings and any other exhilarating activity will not be held during this month. When Abdurrahman (1880-1901) forbade the Shi’ahs from holding the mourning ceremony for a short time, the ceremonies were carried out secretly.” (Pouladi, 247: 2008).

 

8) Ethnicity (Hazara)

 

For the Shi’ahs in Afghanistan the ethnic element of the Hazara has become part of their identity so that the Sunnis do not differentiate between the semantic field of the words “Hazara” and “Shi’ah,” and hence they use them interchangeably. The realities in Afghanistan have constrained wilayati Islamists to introduce themselves not only as Shi’ah representatives but also as leaders of the Hazaras. This became important when ethnicity was considered as the identity card and a criterion for bargaining during the political games in Afghanistan. Given the 1970s developments, Michael Koppky writes: “Shi’ah youths were influenced by nationalist and leftist movements (Maoists).”

 

Unlike the Sunni community, there are no clear boundaries between leftist nationalist and religious movements; the reason is that all these movements, at the first stage stated expressed their Hazara identity except for the groups that were led by some clerics such as Mohseni who did not belong to Hazara people (Koppky, 1982: 113). Within the framework of wilayati political Islam discourse, the executors of this discourse intentionally or unintentionally were identified not only as the Shi’ah political authorities but also as the ethnic leaders. For some of the Hazara people, the element of religion was not sufficient to acknowledge the identity and despite being within the realm of wilayati political Islam they had to consider the element of blood and race as well.

 

Sayyed Askar Mousavi quotes a Hazara student who said: “We know that Chengiz is not our real ancestor. However, the issue is not a mere genealogy, but a political and historical issue is proposed. comparing to other ethnic groups, we would gain reverence and social position through our family relationship with Chengiz. Chengiz has not been worse than many other historical figures. Each race needs a social-historical face. Let Chengiz be our Abdurrahman.” (Mousavi, 2000: 196) The element of ethnicity within the discourse of wilayati political Islam became highlighted during the period through which following the collapse of the communist regime (1992) the Islamist parties had involved in attrition warfare. During this period, the Hazaras saw themselves in a dangerous situation that only the magic of ethnicity could help them. Hence, “Hazara” was among the most used words in Mazari’s works. Mazari saw himself responsible for the Hazara’s fate of that era. He believed that if he fails to restore the rights of the Hazara and the principle of social justice, he would be seen guilty by future generations. According to his view, Hazara’s in Afghanistan’s history has always been guilty in the eyes of the rulers, and so reiterated this statement; “We want that being a Hazara is no longer considered a crime.”

 

Conclusion

 

With the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran that coincided with the People’s Democratic People’s Party in Afghanistan came into power, the Afghan wilayati political Islamists entered the phase of revolution and jihad and began to establish political and military organizations. Though at the time the executors of Shi’ah political Islam were divided into those who follow the ideology of wilayah and those who do not, both groups believed in the political wilayah. The first group accepted the model of Wilayat al-Faqih which was exemplified by Ayatollah Khomeini. Yet, the second group claimed independent guardianship over Shi’ahs and extended its scope to the realm of politics. The reality is that, although executors of political Islam who follow the ideology of wilayah remained committed to the teachings of the Islamic Revolution and the principle of Wilayat al-Faqih until the end of the fourteen years of jihad, the passage of time and political ups and downs greatly reduced their enthusiasm and interest toward the principles. The internal disagreements among them on the one hand and the prolonged war on the other led to the decline of the connection with the Iranian revolution in the late periods of jihad.

 

The hegemony of the wilayati political Islamist discourse in Afghanistan lasted until the collapse of the communist regime in 1992. Nevertheless, this discourse went downhill and largely became out of reach afterward. Within the framework of Laclau’s Discourse Theory, the accessibility of a discourse is an important component for its existence and continuation. Discourses are always seeking hegemony and antagonism, and hence experience ups in downs in terms of gaining political authority. From the beginning of jihad in Afghanistan in 1979 until the collapse of the communist regime, wilayati political Islam was capable of attaining legitimacy because it had been under the influence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. However, since 1992, the correlation of such political Islam with the Islamic Revolution in Iran has become weaker. Although today there are not such strong threads of both types of political Islam (those who accept wilayati ideology and those who do not) in Afghanistan, it should be noted that they are marginalized. Therefore, currently and with the dominance of liberal-democratic discourse, various types of political Islam including wilayati and others are at the threshold of annihilation.

 

It seems that non-wilayati political Islam in Afghanistan has come to an end and has little chance of revival. However, the status of wilayah is distinctly different. As long as a revolutionary spirit and centrality of the Wilayat al-Faqih exist within the political system of Iran, the political Islam affected by wilayati ideology will find the opportunity to revive it in Afghanistan. In order that this type of political Islam returns to politics, at least three important steps are proposed. The first step: The early generation of wilayati Islamists in Afghanistan either died or are in their old age. but these pioneers have not been able to educate alternative actors over the past years; a generation that has close ties with the Islamic Revolution in Iran and observes its ideals.

 

Accordingly, the remaining of wilayati political Islam would play an important role in its reproduction. The second step; the re-emergence of wilayati political Islamist discourse depends on the circumstances. For several reasons, nowadays liberal-democratic discourse is placed at the top while keeping others under pressure. The wilayati political Islam could be an active and dominant actor of the political scene, provided that it avoids integration with ethnicity and engages constructively with other forms of political Islam. Of course, this interaction should be reciprocal and other forms of political Islam also need such an interplay within the internal spheres. The occurrence of this matter depends on the unity, empathy and awareness of the Afghan nation concerning the current hegemonic discourses of the country i.e., the great powers and their regional agents. Third step: wilayati political Islam will not be revived again unless the executors of the Islamic Revolution in Iran restructure the ideal conditions of the 1970s and 1980s and fulfill the potentials of wilayati Islamism in Afghanistan. This will happen when the cultural and scientific relations between the Afghan Shi’ah elites with Iran are increased. Today, important steps have been taken in this regard by the revolutionary institutions of Iran. Likewise, the efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the way of determining the fate of millions of Afghan Shi’ah immigrants is considered a significant step.

 

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