The Role of Political Leadership in Victories and Failures
Political leadership, whether it is embodied in a particular individual or a group plays its role, is a very important factor in facing failure or gaining victory. A wise, courageous, far-sighted and popular political leadership can fill the vacuum left in various fields. In a possible war between two political units, the political leadership of each side will face four basic variables by which it can achieve its goals, that is to say, winning the war or preventing the other side from realizing its agendas.
The Wars Russia Imposed on Iran and the Iranian Leadership
During the 19th-18th centuries, international politics was based on the idea of imperialism, and in the meantime, Iran, due to its geopolitical position, drew the attention of the colonial powers. Apparently, Russia invaded Iran in 1804 under the pretext of Georgia. A land that was part of Iran since the Achaemenid period and even its rulers during the Safavid period were appointed by the kings of Iran. After the weakness of the Safavid reign and the weakening of Iran’s authority in this region, the movement of Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar is regarded as the last attempt to preserve the territory of Iran; because after his movement, Iran lost some of its territories and by the end of Qajar dynasty, its borders were changed.
At that time, the leadership pyramid of Iran consisted of the Shah, the Chancellor, the Crown Prince, and other courtiers. All the courtiers and even the Chancellor considered themselves the servants of the Shah. Hence, during the war with Russia and also with the United Kingdom, the Iranian authorities and leaders could not use their defensive variables. Although there was no significant difference between the two sides in terms of equipment and forces and even Iran had the upper hand (especially in the war with the United Kingdom) in terms of equipment and personnel, the Iranian leadership could not realize its potential of following a religious ideology and the scholars’ jihad fatwa.
Iran’s most important defence strategy, which was fundamentally wrong, was to rely on foreign forces. The Iranian court had expected the support of France and the United Kingdom in these wars. In the first years of the war, at the suggestion of Abbas Mirzaei, the Crown Prince, an alliance was made with France. But in the face of political movements, the Iranian leadership showed immense weakness which probably was the reason for Iran’s defeat.
France gave Iran various types of weapons. The Iranian artillery was equipped by Gaspard-Amédée Gardanne and his accompanying engineers. As a result, self-propelled artillery was provided to Iran that was unparalleled in Asia. However, what made the brilliant victories of the Iranians ineffective was the way of managing and controlling the situation during the war.
The mismanagement of Iran’s political leadership during the war, the inability to distinguish the goals of foreign states from making alliances, the British ambassador’s insistence on making peace with Russia, the weakness of courtiers and armed forces which was rooted in the weak political leadership, and the peace between Ottoman Empire, as well as French, with Russia, caused the Iranian army to be defeated by a limited Russian force (in the Aslanduz region). In the wake of this defeat- which could be easily compensated- the morale of the Iranian court was so weakened that even the mobilization and gathering of 70,000 troops could not strengthen it. Eventually, Iran accepted the ceasefire agreement and hence the Treaty of Gulistan was concluded between the Russian Empire and Iran on 24 October 1813. This Treaty which was the first humiliating treaty in the history of Iran paved the way for the next war. The Treaty confirmed the ceding and inclusion of wider areas north of the Aras River (except Yerevan and Nakhichevan) into the Russian Empire.
Although in the second period of the Iran-Russia wars, as in the first, Iran won the major victories yet the result of the war was Iran’s defeat. In the second war, Iranians, despite the great courage they showed when retaking the occupied territories, faced failure because of the Crown Prince’s despair, the baseness of the Shah and his emphasis on managing the war with the tax that Azerbaijani used to pay, lack of a proper strategy and neglecting to reinforce the fronts and the order of Abbas Mirza that the princes should retreat from the front line.
Eventually, the Russians with 5,000 troops captured Tabriz and hence in addition to consolidating the articles of the Treaty of Gulistan, gained control of the Yerevan and Nakhichevan territories, imposed the payment of an indemnity of five million tomans on the Shah and concluded the Treaty of Turkmenchay. Therefore, in the second war, Iranians, despite the great courage they showed when retaking the occupied territories, faced failure because of the mismanagement of the leadership, and hence the greatest historical defeat of Iran occurred; because of the end of the second war and the Treaty of Turkmanchay, unlike the previous defeats of Iran (Mongols, etc.), institutionalized foreign political-cultural influence in the country. The political leadership at that time was one of the most inefficient governments in Iranian history.
The British Invasion of Southern Iran
The United Kingdom gained the most from the Iran-Russia war, because, on the one hand, Russia was satisfied with keeping the areas north of the Aras River under its control and failed to get closer to India, and on the other hand, Iran was so weak that could not invade India. Thus, for a while, the United Kingdom safely consolidated its growing influence in Iran until the issue of Herat arose. The dispute over Herat began at the end of the reign of Fath Ali Shah and continued during the reign of Mohammad Shah, and despite several deployments of Iranian forces, no definite result was achieved. Finally, during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah, the Iranian forces, in a precautionary measure, conquered Herat in an attempt to thwart the plots of Kabul’s Ruler for occupying the cities of eastern Iran. After the conquest of Herat, which was the third Iranian expedition to Herat in the Qajar dynasty, the United Kingdom issued an ultimatum demanding an unconditional withdrawal of Iranian forces from Herat.
While half of the Iranian forces were in Bushehr and despite the popular resistance of Tangestan, the British forces captured Bushehr with minimal casualties and without facing serious resistance from government forces. Therefore, the United Kingdom gained control of all of Iran’s reserves, along with 65 pieces of artillery. The military commander of the city and the ruler of Bushehr gave their swords to the British officer to show that they have surrendered.
Finally, the Treaty of Paris was signed between Iran and the United Kingdom on March 4, 1857, and accordingly Iran, in addition to withdrawing from Afghanistan, granted numerous trade and political concessions to the United Kingdom.
After the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, the United Kingdom, while expressing its satisfaction with the establishment of peace with Iran, withdrew its forces from Iran and began suppressing the Indian popular uprising. The main reason for Iran’s defeat in this war, as in the Iran-Russia wars, was political leadership.
The Russian-British wars with Iran caused the foreign embassies to become active in Iranian politics. The appointment of the Crown Prince of Iran had to be done at the discretion of Russia, and from then on, a rivalry between Russia and the United Kingdom for winning more concessions began in Iran. Russia and the United Kingdom not only influenced the dismissal and appointment of ministers or policy-making but also interfered in the most private family matters of the court.
The Leadership of the Islamic Revolution of Iran during the Holy Defence (1980-1988)
The Iran-Iraq war is one of the longest and bloodiest wars since World War II. The significance of this war, regardless of its various aspects, in the 200-year history of Iran, lies in the fact that it put an end to the foreign political, economic, and cultural influence in the country, as well as territorial losses, that had been begun in the Qajar dynasty. Objective evidence proves that this was an unequal war in every sense, but the outcome of the war was not what the aggressor country and its supporters would seek and hence they did not achieve their goals.
The Ba’athist regime of Iraq started the war to achieve three main goals: first, capturing Arvand River and the three islands; second, separating Khuzestan province from Iran (which was the goal of the Ba’athist coup in Iraq) and, third, the disintegration of Iran and overthrowing its popular system. These goals had been confirmed by the U.S. government during Saddam Hussein’s meeting with Brzezinski (in the summer of 1980). Former Secretary of State Kissinger predicted that the war would end in ten days with the victory of Iraq.
If the first and second goals of Iraq were achieved, the third one, that is to say, the disintegration of Iran would also be realized; because in addition to the separation of Khuzestan and the severance of Iran’s economic jugular vein, the idea of seeking independence from the country would also be created in other regions of Iran. But the main factors that Iraq did not take into account were the power of the Iranian leadership in motivating the people to defend, the people’s obedience to the leadership, and the extraordinary revolutionary passion of this nation.
Being familiar with the specific conditions of the country and also the war, the political leadership of Iran called for public participation in defending the country as a religious and sacred duty introducing it as a value that takes precedence over other values. When the task of defending the country takes a religious orientation, fulfilling it would also become a religious duty. In this case, the defending force thinks about fulfilling the obligation rather than saving his life. This thinking was more prominent than any other factor during the Iran-Iraq War. The Supreme Leader of the Revolution officially considered the preservation of Islam and the Islamic Republic as the greatest Islamic duty.
There was a need for popular mobilization and the country’s political leadership was successful in doing so. Imam Khomeini’s view of the government and the people (who considered the government as the servant of the nation) caused the issue of defending the country and the government to be left to the general public.
Imam Khomeini’s third defence strategy was not to rely on foreign powers. Foreign supports, including political alliances, military aid, and propaganda, played no role in Iranian’s act of defending the country because the revolutionary leadership (given the Islamic concepts and the historical experience of Iran) did not pursue the policy of relying on foreigners.
From the point of view of the leadership of the Revolution, the adoption of this strategy was a great success for the Iranian nation. He said in this regard: “We thank God that the war did not burden us with the favour of any power, country or superpower, to whom we would have been indebted. Our people, with their trust and reliance on God, struggling alone and without sympathy or assistance from anyone, have overcome the problems.”
During the war, the slogans of Iran’s belligerence and Iraq’s pacifism were raised many times. The Western media, in line with the intelligence, military, political, and economic supports of their governments, put pressure on Iran by launching propaganda campaigns. In contrast, the leadership of the Revolution, by explaining different types of peace and clarifying the peace that Iraq and its supporters seek as well as emphasizing that Iran would only recognize an honourable peace, repeatedly warned about the danger of the Iraqi government and Saddam Hussein to the region. Proposals for a ceasefire were made several times during the first year of the war and afterwards, but the Iranian leadership rejected any ceasefire not until there is even one Iraqi soldier in Iranian territory. In the first year of the war, a ceasefire offer, which was considered a type of political attack, did not mainly refer to the occupation of Iran and the need for the withdrawal of foreign forces from its territory. Furthermore, the ceasefire offers made after the defeat of Saddam’s army did not guarantee lasting peace. In fact, by rejecting these demands, the Iranian political leadership was seeking a real and honourable peace.
Thus, the Ba’athist regime of Iraq did not achieve any of its three priorities; on the contrary, Iran’s first goal was one-hundred percent realized, and with the UN Secretary-General recognizing Iraq as an aggressor, the second agenda was also partly achieved. However, the issue of war compensation is still pending due to the lack of necessary guarantees.
After the war with Iraq, Iran became a key player in world affairs, and not only followed its basic policies with more determination but also its leader, a few months after the ending of the war, in a historic message, invited the leader of the Eastern Bloc to belief in God, distancing from the West and so on.
Repulsing the Ba’athist invasion of Iran and the preservation of Iranian territory, the spirit of self-confidence in all political, military, cultural and economic fields was revived among Iranians for the first time in the last 200 years, and the shortcomings in this regard were overcome. This was the greatest political achievement of the war.
Reference: Journal of Islamic Revolution Studies. Vol 10, No 32, Spring 2013, Pp 61-78.
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