In different revolutions of the world, the position of the armed forces and their orientation toward supporting or opposing the revolutionary forces and the ruling system, have played a decisive role in the fate of revolutions. The reason for the importance of the role of the army lies in the fact that the ruling system can prevent or at least hinder the occurrence of revolution by the means of force. Or, conversely, the revolutionaries can destroy the most important arm of the ruling system by persuading it to join them or take a neutral stance. Given the nature of the Pahlavi regime and the fact that it had the most powerful, well-equipped, and well-trained army in the Middle East, how could the revolutionary people, led by Imam Khomeini (ra), neutralize politically and militarily the regime’s military forces? What makes such a move more important is that the Iranian army was at the peak of its power and should have had the capability to eliminate any threat. In fact, the most unfeasible scenarios were that the Iranian military forces, while enjoying advanced equipment and high-quality training, would eventually fail to save the regime and even engage in anti-monarchist activities. More importantly, despite the Shah’s powerful army, the Islamic Revolution of Iran could successfully overthrow the regime, owing especially to the military forces who helped the revolutionary people.
The rapid victory of the Islamic Revolution did not take place only through direct, bloody and long-term confrontations between people and the army and its collapse and destruction, rather it took place partially because people gained control of the army.
The Position of the Army in the Pahlavi Regime
Examining how the army responded to the Islamic Revolution and identifying the causes of its failure and collapse require addressing the structure of the army, its type of relations and hierarchy as well as its main sources of strength and weakness. After staging the military coup d’état in February 1921, Reza Khan who relied on the army to gain power disbanded all military units and provided all the means to form a single professional army in Iran. The most important task of the army of that period was to eliminate any kind of autonomous power and establish the authority of the central government throughout the country. From the beginning of Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign until the coup d’état of August 19, 1953, the monarchy had little authority and had no other means of gaining power except for the army. The army also could not be very effective in consolidating the regime’s authority, because its defeat in the war against the Allied Forces in 1941, left it with the lowest level of power and strength; thus, it could not establish the foundations of the Shah’s absolute power in the country; in the meantime, the Tudeh Party and the National Front had completely infiltrated the army during these years.
After the coup d’état of August 19, 1953, the Second Pahlavi monarch realized that economic power could not exist without military power, and therefore he decided to establish an absolute power, both inside and outside the region and throughout the world. Thus, in order to maintain his monarchy and seize absolute power in the region and the country, he created a dependent army on the basis of non-native and non-national criteria; as Robert E. Huyser writes: “In general, the army was very disciplined... but it relied on a strong leadership which was manifested in the Shah and the United States, and that is why a chain of command has been created.”
Reasons for the Failure of the Pahlavi Army in Maintaining the Pahlavi Monarchy
The Authoritarian Structure of the Shah’s Army
From the beginning, the structure of the Iranian army was built in such a way that every military force would consider blindly following the commands as his duty. For this reason, the army, which was hierarchically connected to the Shah and was under his command, took its orders and plans from the Shah and acted accordingly to prove its loyalty. Various methods were used to create such a system. In all military camps, for example, the first task in the morning was to offer a group prayer for the physical well-being and survival of the Shah. An intensive propaganda campaign was launched to keep the military forces completely loyal to the Shah and the imperial regime. To that end, some efforts had been made including chanting slogans such as “God, Shah, Homeland” in the morning ceremony of the barracks and giving the title of God to the Shah. Giving rewards to the forces was one of the ways to keep the army loyal.
Gaining promotion in the army also was based on the level of loyalty to the Shah. Not only the promotion but also the maintenance of the position depended on the loyalty of the forces, such that each officer was demoted as fast as he could be promoted on the Shah’s order.
Thus, the army, which was following the Shah’s order, lost its main command when the Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979, thereby experiencing confusion and uncertainty in the face of the revolutionaries. The declaration of neutrality by the Shah’s army on February 11, 1979, clearly shows its passivity, uncertainty and inability to take the initiative in defending the monarchy.
Conflict and Heterogeneity in the Army
Considering the organizational structure of the army can be divided into three categories, namely the upper, middle and lower echelons. While the upper echelon consisted of the commanders and officers who were the main supporters of and loyal to the Shah’s regime, the two other echelons constituted the masses and the general fabric of society. Although these military forces were trained by the government and often had technical expertise, were deprived of the special privileges accorded to the upper echelons and this reveals the discrimination that existed between them. “In military ceremonies, the upper echelons of senior officers or army commanders were recognized by wearing a large number of medals, and sometimes we wondered in which war did they get these badges? However, the low-level army of Iran was more like the peasants of Central Asia and the forces had a rough and harsh appearance,” Anthony Parsons said.
The Cultural-Religious Identification of the Army with the People
The regime neither taught the army forces any particular ideology other than obeying the Shah’s orders nor did it equip them with the necessary knowledge and insight required for dealing with current ideologies. For this reason, both the Tudeh Party and other leftist currents as well as the ideology of Shi’ism and true Islam infiltrated the army. As the army forces began reading the books of the late Shari’ati and the Homafaran marched in front of Imam Khomeini (ra) and pledged allegiance to him and some army commanders also used to go to Qom to visit Jamkaran Mosque.
The harmony between the army and people in terms of norms and values became evident in the month of Muharram when hundreds of soldiers in Qom and Mashhad fled and other soldiers also threatened to follow the orders of religious leaders, not the commanders.
According to the Supreme Leader, while the Shah pinned his hope on the upper echelons of the army, the revolutionaries managed to make the army, which was part of the people, join them:
“Everyone knows that the previous regime had made various investments in the army and had pinned his hopes on it. Of course, it was a vain hope because it invested in a sector that had ceased to function. The top commanders and special elements in the army were affiliated with the monarchy regime... but they were ineffective. The army always has efficiency. The body of the army which was with the people neither received the privileges given by the regime nor could offer hope to it. Therefore, the army’s awareness of the current issues of the country contributed to the failure of the plots designed by the regime and facilitated the victory of the Islamic Revolution. The art of a revolution is that it can gain the attention of the elements of the enemy’s military forces making them believe in its legitimacy, and this makes victory easy and quick. Victory would have been achieved without such a help, but probably with great difficulty and over a much longer period.”
The Strategy of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution to Separate the Army from the Shah
Imam Khomeini (ra), who from the beginning consciously pursued the “separation of the army from the Shah,” on the one hand, urged the people in all his messages not to insult or attack the army forces, and on the other hand, called on them not to kill people and to join Islam and the Islamic Revolution while relying on the military’s spirit of seeking independence, criticizing the army’s dependence on the United States and emphasizing the religious and popular motivations of the military forces. The “flowers against bullets” policy that the Islamic Revolution had adopted against the army, terrified the regime leaders, forcing them to employ the army forces for suppressing street demonstrations in order to strengthen their immunity against the spiritual influence of the Islamic Revolution. Imam Khomeini’s proclamations, which had been issued earlier and called on the soldiers to join the Islamic Revolution and the nation, had caused the top commanders to distrust the forces under their command. The arrival of Imam Khomeini (ra) in Tehran and his historic speech in Behesht-e Zahra included a renewed invitation of the army to join the nation and the Revolution. The introduction of Mr. Bazargan as the Prime Minister by Imam Khomeini (ra) and the formation of the Revolutionary Government made the army increasingly disappear from the scene. On February 8, the parade of Homafaran and officers in the Iranian Air Force before Imam Khomeini (ra) in Refah School, was a symbolic move showing that the army has joined the Revolution.
To separate the army from the Shah, Imam Khomeini (ra) specifically used three tactics. First, introducing the army as becoming the puppet of the foreigners led by the global arrogance, the United States. Thus, he made the army aware of its true identity and nature thereby creating a sense of inferiority and mercenary in its body.
Second, advising the army to join the people and the nation. At this stage, Imam Khomeini (ra) sought to instill a sense of national identity into the army. Third, advising the people to cooperate with the army and welcome the free army, not the dependent one.
After the Islamic Revolution, many individuals and political groups, especially the leftist groups and the People’s Mojahedin Organization, insisted on dissolving the army and creating a new one called the Classless Monotheistic Army. Imam Khomeini (ra) believed that the main problem of the army has been the rule of the tyrannical Shah and lack of reliance on divine teachings, which caused it to serve the interests of the United States and be employed for preserving the monarchy in addition to its main mission of preserving the country’s territorial integrity. Therefore, by changing the command structure and controlling it, the army can serve the people of Iran and become independent thereby carrying out its main mission by relying on national capacities and capabilities.
Reference: Pazhūheshnāmeh-ye Enghelāb-e Eslāmī [A Quarterly Scientific-Research Journal on Islamic Revolution]. Vol. 2, No. 8, Fall 2013, Pp. 139-155.
Archive of The Thought of the Islamic Revolution
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